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Blocked Democracies in 
Central America
Ott o Argueta, Sebastian Huhn, Sabine Kurtenbach, Peter Peetz 
The elections of 6 November 2011 have further damaged Central American democracy. 
Ott o Pérez Molina, a right-wing conservative former general, was elected president 
of Guatemala with 54 percent of all votes cast. On the same day, Daniel Ortega was 
confi rmed for a third term as president of Nicaragua in offi  ce with 62 percent. Both 
elections emphasize the growing trend of authoritarian rule in Central America. 
Analysis
The shortcomings within the Central American transformation towards democracy, the 
establishment of the rule of law, and a policy of social development are clearly not of a 
transient nature, as they have become more and more prominent. These shortcomings 
prevent the rooting of democracy in society that is necessary for its consolidation. 
  After two decades of political transformation, neither social injustice nor poverty 
have been reduced in Central America. Dealing with these historically ingrained 
problems, however, is necessary to politically strengthen and legitimize democracy. 
  The political minimum consensus is increasingly under threat. The supposedly left-
wing parties demand a government policy of active intervention by establishing 
welfare programs; however, they att empt to put their policies into practice at the 
cost of the existing legal framework. 
  The political right, on the other hand, insists that formally democratic procedures 
must be adhered to, but suggests that social injustice and political disintegration 
can be overcome only with a completely free market and a security policy best 
described as an “iron fi st” approach.
  At the same time, both camps try to mobilize their supporters not with policy-
driven programs that aim to solve these critical issues, but with populist slogans and 
loyalty towards certain individuals. The result is a political blockade that prevents 
the deepening and consolidation of democratization. 
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Democracies in Crisis
The symptoms of the persistent crisis of democracy 
in Central America are manifold: they include 
both the devaluation of democracy as a political 
system and the fragmentation and personalization 
of political and social organizations. The 2011 
presidential elections symbolize a return to the 
past on a personal level, too: Former general 
Ott o Pérez received the majority of votes in the 
Guatemalan runoff  election on 6 November de-
spite his likely involvement in grave human rights 
violations during the war. Daniel Ortega was elec-
ted to a third term in offi  ce as the head of state 
of Nicaragua even though the constitution forbids 
it. Additionally, various agents within the entire 
region are att empting to circumvent established 
laws and constitutions. In Guatemala, for instance, 
Sandra Torres, the wife of outgoing president, 
Álvaro Colom, divorced her husband primarily 
to circumvent the constitutional provision against 
close relatives of an incumbent candidate running 
for offi  ce. In El Salvador, President Mauricio Funes 
promoted a bill restricting the independence and 
effi  cacy of the Supreme Court.  
Democratic Opening During War
The democratic opening was a crucial step towards 
ending the long-standing wars in Nicaragua, El 
Salvador and Guatemala, wars that had turned 
Central America into an international hot spot in the 
1980s. However, the specifi c form of transition as 
practiced everywhere in the region turned out to be 
a critical “birth defect” of sorts for democratization 
because it enabled the continuation, or rather 
modernization, of authoritarian structures. The 
established minimum consensus included a com-
mitment to democracy, free elections, and freedom 
of assembly and speech. Both within the region 
and outside of it, expectations were high that the 
social development problems might also be solved 
after the violent and authoritarian regimes on the 
Central American isthmus ended. Two decades 
later, however, it can be observed that the formal 
processes of democratization have led neither to 
a sustainable reduction in violence, nor to a re-
duction of poverty and injustice. Achieving those 
things, however, is critical to fi rmly rooting 
democracy within society, then legitimizing and 
ultimately stabilizing it.
The reasons for the failure of consolidation are, 
in part, intrinsic to the transition to democracy as 
practiced in Central America. Structural issues 
such as widespread poverty and inequality, 
powerful migration currents, and the weakness 
and fragmentation of civil society also inhibit the 
consolidation of democratic structures.
The political opening in Central America was 
primarily initiated by the authoritarian rulers 
themselves, albeit due to pressure by external 
agents in many cases, particularly the United 
States and Europe. As a result, groups excluded 
from elections until then – especially the political 
left – were now able to join the political process. 
The parties emerging from former guerilla 
organizations initially became the strongest 
oppositional forces in El Salvador and Nicaragua; 
in 2006 and 2009, however, these parties won the 
presidencies of Nicaragua and El Salvador with 
Daniel Ortega and Mauricio Funes, respectively. 
The high hopes of subsequently socially rooting 
democracy were disappointed. 
The transition enabled authoritarian enclaves – 
such as the military, whose members had special 
rights –  to survive and gave parties opposed to 
reform signifi cant veto powers. Policies geared 
towards the rooting of democracy in society re-
gularly fail due to a lack of parliamentary majority 
and to obstruction by business associations, the 
latt er using the infl uence they hold with the press 
and politicians. Physical force against members of 
oppositional groups and civil society organizations 
is used as well, subsequently dampening the 
courage and will of the citizens to take part in 
the political process. The fact that politics and 
the justice system alike are corrupt and cater to 
interest groups further reduces the rule of law; 
public policies are often deeply ingrained in 
historic practices, showing litt le change over time. 
This can be witnessed in both the controversies 
surrounding the government’s role in reducing 
poverty and inequality, and the militarization of 
public security. 
The Role of Government in Welfare Policy
Central America, too, has seen a rise in the Human 
Development Index over the past two de cades, and 
the percentage of poor people within the population 
has decreased. However, the averages the Index 
is based on mask deep-seated and persistent 
disparities (Estado de la Región 2011). Across all 
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Central American countries, the indigenous, Afro-
Caribbean, and rural populations are signifi cantly 
poorer than the urban, non-indigenous population. 
The 2010 Human Development Report in Latin 
America (PNUD 2010) revealed the systemic 
factors that perpetuate inequality from generation 
to generation. The fi scal structure is mentioned 
fi rst: the main problem is the minimal taxation 
of income and estate combined with the high 
taxation of consumption and the dominance of 
indirect taxation in general. Change has been slow 
even in those countries whose administrations 
were willing to advocate for more equity.
Fiscal reform is one of the major challenges 
in Guatemala’s post-war era. Though the peace 
accord of 1996 includes a tax hike, eff orts to enact 
such legislation and to improve methods of tax 
collection enjoyed only limited success. The tax 
rate of 11.3 percent of GDP is one of the lowest on 
the entire continent. Only 2.5 percent of tax revenue 
comes from direct taxes; the remaining revenue 
comes from indirect taxation. In El Salvador, the 
tax rate is only slightly higher (13.6 percent) and, 
similarly, the political resistance from businesses 
– in the form of both media and fi nancial support 
of particular presidential candidates – prevents 
any kind of tax reform (UNDP 2010: 96).1
External agents and the export-oriented model 
of development facilitate the strengthening of 
these structures in the entire region. Honduras had 
subscribed to a model of development based on 
the exploitation of natural resources instead of the 
production of goods for a long time. And though 
the 1990s and early 2000s were accompanied by 
the advent of an enclave economy in the form of 
the maquila sector, the economic growth it initiated 
was not sustainable. The Special Economic 
Zones, which are mostly free of taxation and cus-
toms, have yielded tens of thousands of jobs, 
particularly for young women from lower classes. 
However, as these zones are hardly interwoven 
with the local economies, the positive eff ects on 
economic and social development for the country 
as a whole remain negligible. To this day, the most 
well-educated young adults emigrate beyond 
the borders of their region, mostly to the United 
States. Meanwhile, money transfers from migrant 
workers to their family members have become 
the primary source of income. While this money 
does enable the survival of many families or the 
1 By way of comparison: Brazil has a tax rate of 35.8 percent, the 
United States 19.8 percent. 
purchase of imported goods such as refrigerators 
and consumer electronics, only small amounts are 
invested in local development.
The 2007 shift to the left by the former presi-
dent of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya, resulted in a 
temporarily stronger focus of public policies on 
welfare. For instance, Zelaya raised minimum 
wages by up to 60 percent. However, since his 
2009 ouster and the subsequent political crisis, 
the country has gone back to its traditional model 
with regards to development policy. Both the 
administration and the parliament are currently 
initializing the establishment of “Charter Cities” 
(“Ciudades Modelos”) as a radical further stage of 
development of Special Economic Zones. Ameri-
can economist Paul Romer’s concept designates a 
portion of land – in Honduras, an area of up to 400 
square miles – that receives extensive autonomy 
with regards to administrative powers, legislation, 
jurisprudence, economy and trade. These Charter 
Cities will then, in theory, give an economic 
growth impulse to the rest of the country.
In Nicaragua – the poorest of all Central Ameri-
can countries – welfare politics and the fi ght against 
poverty have become more important since the 
inauguration of President Ortega in 2007; however, 
the relevant welfare programs are often linked to 
Ortega’s populism and the political machine, the 
latt er of which is often criticized by civil groups. 
UNDP acknowledged the Ortega administration’s 
successes with regards to education policy – the 
administration had previously extended free 
access to elementary education. The initiatives for 
the improvement of health care systems and the 
fi ghting of poverty can also be characterized as 
serious eff orts. However, none of these programs 
was initiated altruistically; they primarily ensure 
Ortega’s continued popularity among large parts 
of the population despite the circumvention of 
democracy and existing legislation. His success 
in the 6 November elections, where he was re-
elected with over 60 percent of the popular vote, 
confi rmed this. In Guatemala, too, criticism has 
been leveled at the lack of transparency and the 
political exploitation of “Mi familia progresa,” 
a program that supports 1 million families in 
poverty. The program was coordinated by the 
president’s wife, Sandra Torres, who was accused 
of using it to lay the foundations of her own 
campaign in 2011.
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The Lax Handling of the Rule of Law
Another structural problem facing the develop-
ment of democracy in Central America is the 
severe defi cit with regards to the rule of law. The 
prevalence of impunity of even felonies such as 
murder and the rampant corruption are only the 
tip of the iceberg. A particularly problematic issue 
is that the administrations themselves are the ones 
undermining the rule of law in the fi rst place. 
This became most apparent in 2009 in Honduras, 
when President Zelaya was removed from the 
country in the dead of night by his own military. 
While the armed forces acted in accord with other 
governmental forces (such as the parliament and 
the Supreme Court), they never claimed power for 
themselves, much unlike “classic” coup d’etats of 
the past. Just a few hours after Zelaya’s involuntary 
exile, the parliament named its president, Roberto 
Michelett i, head of state ad interim, as elections 
had already been set for November 2009 (Peetz  
2009). A truth commission charged with the 
investigation and constitutional assessment of 
these events reached its verdict in mid-2011 – 
Zelaya’s removal was unconstitutional and the act 
itself was to be called a coup. At the same time, the 
commission also noted that Zelaya himself had 
broken the law numerous times. He was alleged to 
have overridden legally binding decisions made 
by other government bodies, blatantly ignoring 
due process all the while.2 Democratic rules seem 
to be respected neither by the government nor 
by society in general; as a result, one must doubt 
the establishment of democratic values within the 
Honduran political class in general. 
The political elite’s disrespect of the existing 
legal framework and the people also becomes 
apparent in the politically and tactically motivated 
dissolution of the marriage of Guatemala’s Álvaro 
Colom to Sandra Torres. The country’s constitution 
forbids close relatives of incumbent presidents to 
run for the same offi  ce. By way of divorce, the 
relation was to be legally dissolved, enabling 
Sandra Torres to become an eligible candidate for 
the presidency. Ultimately, however, the Supreme 
Court confi rmed the election council’s decision not 
2 This report was fi led by the government-appointed Comisión 
de la Verdad y la Reconciliación (online: <www.cvr.hn>). The 
alternative Comisión de Verdad, organized by human rights 
groups and non-governmental organizations (online: <www.
comisiondeverdadhonduras.org>) has not yet published its 
fi nal verdict. It will most likely come to a diff erent conclusion 
than the CVR, particularly with regards to the involvement of 
Zelaya and his followers.
to allow her candidacy, avoiding a circumvention 
of the law. 
In Nicaragua, President Daniel Ortega and his 
politically infl uential wife Rosario Murillo have 
been consistently and successfully undermining 
the rule of law since 2007. Initially, major opposi-
tional parties were excluded from local elections 
in 2008 and 2009 by the Supreme Electoral 
Council, an institution loyal to Ortega. This ex-
clusion also applied during the presidential and 
parliamentary elections in November 2011 and 
caused signifi cant harm to the Alianza MRS (Mo-
vimiento de Renovación Sandinista). The latt er is 
a union of various left-wing parties, but above all 
of Sandinista parties that broke with the Frente 
Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in the 
1990s in protest against Ortega. Moreover, the 
Sandinista citizens’ councils, which were instituted 
in 2007 and are under the control of the president’s 
wife, eff ectively constitute a parallel structure 
alongside the existing public administration. These 
councils, rather than the responsible municipal 
governments, allot funds made available by the 
government for welfare programs and use them 
to exert political pressure. The Supreme Court 
legitimized these councils in 2008, though they 
answer directly to the party in power, not to the 
parliament. Important positions within the police 
force and the military, too, were given to persons 
loyal to Ortega in 2007. The Supreme Court, also 
completely occupied by judges loyal to the FSLN 
since 2010, ruled that Ortega could run for a 
second consecutive presidential term, even though 
the constitution forbids the direct re-election of a 
president and completely rules out a third term. As 
a result, the court violated existing law twice over 
by fi rst disregarding parliament and then ruling 
against the constitution. In order to democratically 
validate Ortega’s candidacy, the parliament would 
have had to amend the constitution. 
El Salvador, too, experienced bitt er alterca-
tions in the summer of 2011 when the two do-
minant parties, Frente Farabundo Martí para 
la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) and Alianza 
Republicana Nacionalista de El Salvador (Arena) 
att empted to pass a bill limiting the Supreme 
Court to unanimous verdicts only. This would 
have damaged not only the court’s independence, 
but also its general functionality. Only massive 
protests by civil society organizations eventually 
led to the bill’s being withdrawn. 
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The Lack of a Socially Established Democracy 
The inability of Central America’s political systems 
to overcome diffi  culties and fi nd appropriate so-
lutions, along with their constant undermining of 
the rule of law, indicate the problem at the core 
of the political transformation of Central America: 
its lack of societal rooting.
Table 1 contains the results of surveys in which 
the participants
1) would not support a military regime under any 
circumstances, 
2) might tolerate a violation of law “in dire 
circumstances,” or 
3) would – hypothetically – support a military 
coup. 
These numbers confi rm the consistently weak 
rooting of the concept of democracy within Central 
American society. In the case of strict rejection of 
a potential military regime, the low Guatemalan 
and Honduran numbers are most striking. In both 
countries, more than 50 percent of participants 
would tolerate a military regime in politically 
troubling times. Even in Costa Rica, a country 
that, unlike the others, last experienced military 
rule almost 100 years ago and therefore boasts a 
long democratic tradition, one out of ten citizens 
would, if in doubt, support a military regime. The 
comparative numbers from the previous year (in 
parentheses) also indicate that the unconditional 
support for democracy is waning. 
The second poll is equally symptomatic of the 
crisis of Central American democracies. Almost 
half of all survey participants in Costa Rica 
said that they could tolerate a circumvention 
of applicable law, parliament, and democratic 
institutions in order to solve diffi  cult problems. In 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala, roughly a 
third of participants would accept such a violation 
of democratic principles. The numbers from the 
previous year’s poll once again show that the 
popularity of non-democratic governance, high as 
it already was, has increased even further within 
the entire region. 
The third poll illustrates that the potentially 
high acceptance of a military coup in El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua decreased from 2008 
to 2010. This may well be a deterrence caused 
by the coup in Honduras. When confronted 
with the fact that a coup might become reality 
and that the country might be barred from 
international fi nancial transactions as a result of 
a coup, some participants apparently changed 
their minds.3 Nevertheless, the considerably 
signifi cant popularity of a hypothetical coup 
indicates that the Honduran coup is seen as 
much less of a scandal within the region than 
it is in international diplomatic circles and the 
international community. 
3 The World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund ceased their cooperation 
and, as a result, all transfers of funds to Honduras only a few 
days after the coup occurred, and did not resume them until 
the Lobo administration assumed offi  ce in February 2010. 
Table 1: Popular Support of Authoritarian Politics
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2008 2010
Costa Rica 90% (91) 47% (29) N/A 27.8%
El Salvador 57% (59) 47% (35) 43.1% 40.9%
Guatemala 33% (42) 35% (31) 38.3% 46.0%
Honduras 47% (58) 38% (25) 51.6% 30.0%
Nicaragua 70% (75) 30% (27) 42.2% 35.4%
Sources: 1 and 2 = Latinobarómetro 2010 (2009); 3 = LAPOP 2010.
- 6 -GIGA Focus International Edition 5/2011
Law and Order Instead of Fighting Poverty
The high crime rates in Guatemala, Honduras and 
El Salvador, the fact that this topic carries major 
political importance in all three countries and in 
Costa Rica, and the general fear of crime all serve 
to further damage democratic processes. In Central 
America – with the exception of Nicaragua – 
elections are not won through promises of fi ghting 
poverty and enacting welfare policies, but by 
promising to take an iron fi st approach in the fi ght 
against crime. Some examples:
• In 2001, Ricardo Maduro won the 2001 
presidential election thanks to his pledge to 
fi ght youth gangs with an iron fi st. The fact 
that Honduras’ current president, Porfi rio 
Lobo, appointed the same minister of public 
security – Óscar Álvarez – as did his predecessor 
Maduro, shows the continuity of diff erent 
administrations in this particular area. In mid-
September 2011, President Lobo suddenly 
removed Minister Álvarez from offi  ce because 
of the latt er’s att empt to gain special powers 
from parliament in order to be able to remove 
supposedly corrupt members of the police 
force. Should the former minister decide to 
att empt a political comeback – perhaps as a 
presidential candidate for the 2013 elections – 
he would most likely have an excellent chance 
of winning.
• In El Salvador in 2004, right-wing conservative 
Antonio Saca was also elected on an iron fi st 
platform. His moderately left-wing successor, 
Funes, also makes use of the military to fi ght 
crime and additionally wants to implement a 
“security tax.” 
• In Guatemala, the iron fi st subject was at the 
center of Ott o Pérez Molina’s 2007 candidacy, 
too, though the social democrat Álvaro Colom 
ended up winning the election. In 2011, the 
former general once again put the topic front 
and center in his campaign and announced 
an increased use of the military in order to 
ensure public safety. He won the presidential 
election in November 2011. Once inaugurated, 
he immediately announced the appointment 
of a former military offi  cer as interior minister 
and the use of the special forces group 
“Kaibiles” to ensure public safety. As a result, 
security policies will be further militarized, 
even beyond the high levels of the past – the 
advancements made during the peace process 
will be eff ectively repealed. 
• In Costa Rica, too, the promise of an iron fi st 
approach for a more successful fi ght against 
crime was at the core of the 2010 campaign 
of Laura Chinchilla, who was later elected 
president. Her campaign slogan was “Strong 
hand to punish, intelligent hand to prevent.” 
Prevention, in this case, is primarily understood 
as monitoring – for instance, surveilling school-
yards and public places. Of particular note is 
the fact that a social democrat made the image 
of the iron fi st, albeit in a “light” version of 
sorts, the central message of her campaign in 
the only stable democracy in Central America 
(Huhn 2011). 
These successful campaigns prove that Central 
American candidates for offi  ce currently gather 
support with the “law and order” principle while 
welfare policy and a deeper understanding of 
democracy appear to take a back seat. The call for 
democratic solutions and rule of law is – in the 
few places it is utt ered at all – a quiet one, slowly 
fading into the background, unheard.
Conclusion
Despite its political opening and the ending of 
wars, Central America remains far from solving 
its historic problems of poverty, inequality, the 
lack of rule of law, and defi cits in democracy. 
The societal rooting of democracy is inhibited 
both by governmental resistance to active welfare 
policy and by the undermining of the minimum 
standards of the rule of law, as well as by the 
fact that many important political agents keep 
coming back to repressive and violent strategies 
of control. However, the structural problems in 
the region and the current blockades can only 
be successfully overcome when the rule of law 
and democratic proceedings alongside active 
welfare policies stand at the core of a minimum 
consensus in society (the social contract). As long 
as this is not the case, Central America’s path to 
democratization will continue to be blocked. 
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